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Abstract 
The role of the audit committee in financial reporting has 
received significant attention in accounting research. 
Researchers have examined whether certain audit 
committee characteristics (ACCs) mitigating managers 
earnings management practices. Recently, literature 
provides evidence that companies, under different 
reasons, switched earnings management practices from 
accrual-based to real earnings management (REM). The 
main objective of this study is to review the literature 
that investigated the relationship between ACCs and 
REM. The literature to date seems to offer inconsistent 
results, even though studies mostly show insignificant 
relationship. This conclusion suggests that the 
effectiveness of the audit committee must be improved 
and future studies should further investigate the role of 
ACCs on mitigating REM. Finally, this review of the 
literature has the possible to help policymakers, and 
researchers to evaluate the audit committee role and 
hence enhancing its monitoring on REM practices. 
Keywords: Audit committee characteristics, real 
earnings management, financial reporting quality. 
1. Introduction 
Several global accounting scandals happened in 
recent decades, and the cornerstone for these 
scandals was earnings manipulation (i.e. Enron in 
2001, WorldCom in 2002, American Insurance in 
2005, Transmile in 2007, Lehman Brothers in 
2008, and Toshiba in 2015). Such scandals reduced 
investors’ confidence in financial statements and 
led to an increase in the public perception about 
earnings manipulation and financial reporting 
quality (Hamid, Shafie, Othman, Hussin, & Fadzil, 
2013). Companies’ managers, under different 
motivations, used to improve their companies’ 
image by applying several techniques of earnings 
manipulation which helped them in preventing 
reporting losses or low earnings. Such techniques 
might mislead users of financial information 
(Burgstahler & Dichev, 1997; Malik, 2015; Saleh, 
Iskandar, & Rahmat, 2005). 
This practice is called earnings management which 
may affect the quality of financial reporting and 
reduce its reliability. Further earnings management 
is not only reducing companies’ performance but 
also leads to weakening value of the companies 
(Graham, Harvey, & Rajgopal, 2005; 
Roychowdhury, 2006; Zang, 2012). Literature 
provides evidence that managers usually engage in 
two types of earnings management; accrual 
earnings management (AEM) and real earnings 
management (REM) (e.g. Graham et al., 2005; 
Healy, 1985; Ipino & Parbonetti, 2017; Kothari, 
2001; Malik, 2015; Mansor, Che Ahmad, Ahmad-
Zaluki, & Osman, 2013; Roychowdhury, 2006; 
Saleh et al., 2005). However, Talbi, Ali Omri, 
Guesmi and Ftiti (2015) mentioned that previous 
studies focus on AEM whereas EM remains a 
largely unexplored area. Therefore, this paper 
reviews studies that examined the effect of ACCs 
on REM.  
The review outcomes show inconsistent results, 
even though studies mostly show insignificant 
relationship. This conclusion suggests that the 
effectiveness of the audit committee (AC) must be 
improved and future studies should further 
investigate the role of ACCs on mitigating REM. 
Finally, this review of the literature has the possible 
to help policymakers, and researchers to evaluate 
the AC role and hence enhancing its monitoring on 
REM practices. 
2. Real Earnings Management  
REM refers to managers behaviour to real activities 
with the intention to affect reported earnings. 
Roychowdhury (2006, p. 337) defined REM as a 
“departures from normal operational practices, 
motivated by managers’ desire to mislead at least 
some stakeholders into believing certain financial 
reporting goals have been met in the normal course 
of operations. These departures do not necessarily 
contribute to firm value even though they enable 
managers to meet reporting goals”. 
ISSN: 2321-8819 (Online) 2348-7186 (Print) Impact Factor: 1.498 Vol. 6, Issue 12, December, 2018  
129 
Asian Journal of Multidisciplinary Studies, 6(12) December, 2018 
 
  
  
 
 
 
The literature reported different techniques that 
managers may apply in practising REM. 
Roychowdhury highlighted three techniques that 
companies may use to skip reporting losses during 
a specific time. First, increasing production units to 
reduce the overhead costs per unit which results in 
a reduction on the good sold and untimely reported 
earnings are enhanced. Second, boosting sales 
volume by offering more discounts on sales prices 
or easier credit terms that results in reporting high 
earnings. Third, reducing discretionary expenses 
such as research and development or general and 
administrative expenses that result in increasing 
earnings reported in the financial report. 
In addition to these techniques, Bartov (1993) finds 
that managers employ timing of asset sales to 
enhance earnings of the company through the gains 
from selling these assets when they realise that the 
targeted earnings may not materialise. Further, 
Herrmann, Inoue, and Thomas (2003) find that 
companies in Japan have managed earnings 
through selling marketable securities or fixed assets 
and using the gains (or losses) to adjust the actual 
operating income to meet forecasts. Furthermore, 
managers may use stock repurchase as a REM 
technique to adjust earnings per share (Bens, 
Nagar, Skinner, & Wong, 2003; Burnett, Cripe, 
Martin, & McAllister, 2012; Hribar, Jenkins, & 
Johnson, 2006). 
Researchers provide evidence that REM garbles the 
market as it is associated with the level of 
information asymmetry(Abad, Cutillas-Gomariz, 
Sánchez-ballesta, & Yague, 2018). Further, REM is 
a signal of worse financial performance in the 
future (Cohen & Zarowin, 2010; Cupertino, 
Martinez, & Costa Jr, 2016; Gunny, 2005; Moradi, 
Salehi, & Zamanirad, 2015; Tabassum, Kaleem, & 
Nazir, 2015). Recently, studies provided evidence 
that financial fraud companies engage in REM 
practice before the fraud event (Nasir, Ali, 
Razzaque, & Ahmed, 2018; Perols & Lougee, 
2011). This evidence indicates that REM should be 
after research investigation. Therefore, this paper 
focuses on reviewing the literature related to ACCs 
and REM. 
3. Audit Committee Monitoring Role   
Audit committee is one of the most important 
internal governance monitoring mechanisms in the 
company. It plays a vital role in monitoring 
financial reporting to ensure financial reporting 
quality and companies accountability (Zhang, 
Zhou, & Zhou, 2007). However, the quality of AC 
depends on the effectiveness of members. As 
mentioned by Menon and Williams (1994), the 
presence of an AC does not mean that effective 
monitoring is present. Committee members should 
also be active and independent. 
The agency theory explains the relationship 
between ACCs and earnings management. The 
theory postulates that the presence of a high level 
of the agency problem demands a high monitoring 
quality (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). According to 
Cadbury (1992) and Klein (2002), AC monitors the 
company’s financial reporting process and meets 
regularly with external auditors, internal auditor, 
and financial managers to review the financial 
statement. It also evaluates the internal accounting 
controls and audit process. Krishnamoorthy, 
Wright, and Cohen (2002) state that the audit 
committee is established to assist the board in 
implementing their duties in ensuring a high audit 
quality and monitoring financial reporting process. 
Lin and Hwang (2010) indicate that a good 
corporate governance structure assists managers to 
properly utilise the companies resources in the best 
interest of absentee owners. They add that board of 
the director and its committees are the primarily 
responsible for oversight on management. Al-
Rassas and Kamardin (2016) provide evidance that 
audit committee indepence assocciatedfg with 
earnings quality. Therefore, this paper reviews the 
literature that examined the relationship between 
AC different charecterstics and REM. 
4. Methodology 
The current paper reviews the studies that 
examined the relationship between ACCs and REM 
during the last ten years period (2008 – 2017). 
About seven papers obtained from the Scopus 
database and Google scholar. Table 1 shows a 
summary of the previous studies results. The 
review organised based on the ACCs (size, 
independence, financial expertise, meeting, tenure, 
additional directorship, stock, chair characteristics). 
5. Discussion and Summary of the Previous 
Studies Findings  
Previous studies have investigated the role of some 
of audit committee characteristics on REM and 
provided mixed evidence. The AC comprises 
several characteristics that may enhance its quality 
in monitoring functions and results in preventing or 
mitigating REM which ultimately enhances the 
financial reporting quality. Except the study 
conducted by Kang and Kim (2012) which 
examines the relationship between presence of AC 
(measured AC as a dummy variable that takes one 
if the audit committee existing and zero otherwise) 
and REM, and find that existing of audit committee 
plays a significant role in mitigating REM, other 
studies examined the relationship between ACCs 
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and REM. Findings of the previous studies that 
examined the relationship between ACCs and REM 
discussed in the following sections. 
5.1 Audit Committee Size and Real Earnings 
Management 
In term of audit committee size, it has argued that 
audit committee size plays an important role in 
monitoring earnings manipulations, as AC with a 
greater number of outside directors means more 
knowledge and expertise and hence high 
monitoring quality.  However, evidence reported 
by previous studies show that, except for the study 
by Hassan and Ibrahim (2014) which provides 
evidence on significant negative relationship 
between audit committee size and REM, all other 
previous studies failed to find significant 
relationship (Abdullah & Wan Hussin, 2015; 
Garven, 2015; Sun, Lan, & Liu, 2014; 
Visvanathan, 2008). These results may indicat that 
the audit committee size is not an important driver 
for a good AC monitoring on REM practices. 
5.2 Audit Committee Independence and Real 
Earnings Management 
Audit committee independence refers to the 
proportion of the independent directors in the audit 
committee. A common prediction is that 
monitoring functions will increase when the AC is 
more independent, and also theories postulate that 
when the board includes more numbers of 
independent directors, it will better oversee and 
control the executive director's actions and connect 
the company with its external environment (Fama 
& Jensen, 1983; Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). 
Krishnamoorthy et al. (2002) show that the audit 
committee independence is one of the 
characteristics that should be considered by the AC 
to work effectively. Empirically, studies provide 
inconsistent results. For example, Hassan and 
Ibrahim (2014)  find a significant negative 
relationship between audit committee 
independence and REM, while Abdullah and Wan 
Hussin (2015) and Visvanathan (2008) find that 
AC independence has no significant role in 
mitigating REM.  
5.3 Audit Committee Financial Expertise and 
Real Earnings Management 
An important element of ACCs that has gained 
consideration of regulators and researchers is the 
financial expertise (Dhaliwal, Naiker, & Navissi, 
2010). Many professional and regulatory bodies 
worldwide have suggested that AC members 
should have sufficient financial expertise to 
discharge their responsibilities. AC members with 
financial knowledge help in better understanding 
the accounting procedures and financial reporting 
process (Lin, Xiao, & Tang, 2008). Theoretically, 
resource dependence theory assumed that directors 
bring four benefits to organisations: providing 
information through advances in the different 
strategic area, preferential access to resources, links 
firms with the external environment through 
channels of information, and establishing 
legitimacy (Hillman, Withers, & Collins, 2009; 
Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). Therefore, it can be 
argued that directors with financial knowledge, 
skills, and expertise are likely to increase the 
monitoring role and enhance the quality of 
financial reporting. Empirically, studies provide 
mixed results, for example, Abdullah and Wan 
Hussin (2015), and Hassan and Ibrahim (2014) find 
a significant negative relationship between AC 
financial expertise, whereas Garven (2015), and 
Sun et al. (2014) find no significant effect of AC 
financial expertise on REM. 
5.4 Audit Committee Meetings and Real 
Earnings Management 
Audit committee meeting refers to the number of 
AC meetings held during the fiscal year. It has 
argued that AC that meets infrequently are likely to 
be effective monitors of managers and focus on 
issues like REM. Empirically, previous studies 
conducted by Garven (2015), and Hassan and 
Ibrahim (2014) reported that AC meeting 
effectively curbs REM as it is statistically 
negatively and significantly related REM. 
However,  Abdullah and Wan Hussin (2015), and 
Visvanathan (2008) found an insignificant 
relationship between audit committee meeting and 
REM. 
5.5 Audit Committee Tenure and Real Earnings 
Management 
Previous studies have investigated audit committee 
members tenure. Researchers argued that AC 
directors with long period might have a better 
experience in overseeing managers and provide 
better monitoring of financial reporting (Sun et al., 
2014). This argument in line with evidence 
provided by Beasley (1996) which reported that 
financial reporting fraud reduced when companies 
have a long tenure of outside directors. However, 
studies failed to find a significant relationship 
between AC members tenure and REM in the US 
market (e.g. Garven, 2015; Sun et al., 2014). 
5.6 Audit Committee Additional Directorships 
and Real Earnings Management 
Previous studies also examined the role of audit 
committee members additional directorship and 
REM. Director additional directorship in others 
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companies may help them to enhance their 
monitoring role as they can gain greater experience 
form these different positions (Bédard, Chtourou, 
& Courteau, 2004; Sun et al., 2014). Another view 
is that directors with additional directorship may 
become less effective as they are busy.   
Empirically, studies provide evidence that audit 
committee members additional directorship 
positively associate with REM (Garven, 2015; Sun 
et al., 2014).  
5.7 Audit Committee Equity Shareholding and 
Real Earnings Management 
Audit committee members with high stock 
ownership structure may have greater motivations 
to monitor managers. Equity shareholdings by AC 
directors may create greater incentive for these 
members to align their interest with the company’s 
shareholder's interest. Empirically, Sun et al. 
(2014) examined the association between AC block 
shareholding and REM in the US market. They 
found that ACs block shareholdings do not 
associate with REM. Further, Garven (2015) 
examined the relationship between audit committee 
stock ownership and REM in the US
 market for the years 2005-2007 and find 
an insignificant relationship between AC stock 
ownership and REM. The results of these studies 
may indicate that AC equity shareh
olding does not play a significant role in enhancing the effectiveness of the monitoring and hence reducing 
REM. 
NO 
Author(s) & 
Year 
Country 
Sample and 
period 
ACCs 
REM 
Proxies* 
Findings  
1 
(Visvanathan, 
2008) 
US 
6,759 firm 
years, 
(1996-2002) 
AC 
Independence 
ACFO 
APRC 
ADIE 
All AC variables have an 
insignificant relationship with 
REM except AC meeting 
found to be enhancing REM 
through discretionary 
expenses.  
    AC Size    
    
AC Meeting 
  
  
2 
(Kang & 
Kim, 2012) 
Korea 
1,104 firm 
years, 
(2005-2007) 
AC within 
the company 
take one and 
0 otherwise 
 
ACFO 
APRC 
ADIE  
REM 
Existing of AC plays a 
significant role in mitigating 
REM. 
3 
(Hassan & 
Ibrahim, 
2014) 
Nigeria 
20 
manufacturing 
companies 
(2007–2012) 
AC 
Independence 
REM 
AC independence; financial 
literacy; size and meetings are 
significant in checkmating 
REM. 
    
AC Financial 
Literacy  
  
    AC Size    
    
AC Meetings 
 
  
4 
(Sun et al., 
2014) 
US 
100 firm-year 
 (2007-2010) 
AC Financial 
Expertise  
ACFO 
APRC 
ADIE  
Only Audit committee 
members’ additional 
directorships are positively 
associated with REM. Other 
four AC characteristics have 
no significant effect on REM. 
    AC Tenure   
    
AC 
Directorships 
  
    
AC  Block 
shareholdings 
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NO 
Author(s) & 
Year 
Country 
Sample and 
period 
ACCs 
REM 
Proxies* 
Findings  
    AC Size   
5 
(Abdullah & 
Wan Hussin, 
2015) 
Malaysia 
216  firms 
(2009) 
AC Size REM 
Only AC financial expertise 
negatively associate with 
REM. 
    
AC 
Independence 
  
    
AC Financial 
Expertise  
  
    AC Activity   
6 
(Garven, 
2015) 
US 
296 firm-year 
(2005-2007) 
AC Meeting  
REM (1 
if the 
firm 
engages 
in REM, 
and 0 
otherwise 
The study finds that AC 
meeting negatively associates 
with REM, while the number 
of outside directorships held 
by AC members is positively 
related to REM. 
    AC Tenure   
    
AC Outside 
Directorship 
  
    AC Size   
    
AC Financial 
Expertise  
  
    AC Stock   
7 (Xiong, 2016) China 
7178 firm-
year, 
(2005 to 
2014) 
AC Chair 
Gender 
REM  
The female chairperson,    
long-tenured chairperson,  
older chairperson, and more 
educated chairperson are 
associated with lower REM. 
*ACFO refers to abnormal cash flow from operation, APRC refers to abnormal production costs, ADIE refers to abnormal 
discretionary expenses, REM refers to the aggregate value of the real earnings management measurements. 
5.8 Audit Committee Chair Characteristics and 
Real Earnings Management 
Audit committee chair plays an important role in 
driving the AC. According to Turley and Zaman 
(2007), the chair of the audit committee has a 
powerful role in the AC, and internal and external 
auditors prefer to discuss issues related to financial 
reporting with the chair rather than other AC 
members. Schmidt and Wilkins (2013) argue that 
the AC chairperson is most responsible for 
monitoring the procedures of financial reporting. 
However, studies that investigated the role of the 
AC chair in mitigating REM are limited. For 
example, Xiong (2016) examined the relationship 
between AC chair characteristics (gender, tenure, 
age, and education) and REM in China. Xiong 
found that companies with AC chair who is female, 
older, long-tenured, and more educated are 
associated with lower REM. These results 
emphasis the positive role of the AC chairperson 
on monitoring managers opportunities behaviour. 
 
6. Conclusion and Avenue for Research 
The primary purpose of this paper is to provide a 
comprehensive review of the empirical literature 
that investigated the relationship between audit 
committee characteristics and real earnings 
management. The study is expected to enhance the 
understanding of the policymakers, and researchers 
about the role of the AC related to REM. We find 
that recent studies were concerned with REM as an 
alternative type of earnings management that 
companies switched to use it rather than accrual 
earnings management. Overall, review outcomes 
indicate that the role of audit committee 
characteristics in mitigating REM is ambiguous as 
the results are inconsistent. Therefore, future 
studies may consider this review outcomes and 
further investigate the role of audit committee 
quality on limiting REM practising. Future studies 
may consider other characteristics that may 
enhance the effectiveness of audit committees such 
as accounting and law expertise, audit committee 
gender diversity, and audit committee members’ 
remuneration. 
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